"Heads I win, tails you lose."

I was at a private lunch in the City some 15 years ago discussing whether hedge fund investments should be considered a new and distinct asset class. A very prominent hedge fund trader was asked his opinion. Surprisingly, he said that hedge funds were less a new method for investment, than a new method for higher remuneration. The appeal of hedge funds was in the outsize fees rewarding the fund managers rather than any superior returns for investors.

I was reminded of that lunch again this morning by two pieces in my inbox. The first referenced a paper from the Bank of England estimating the public subsidy of the UK's largest banks at more than £220 billion during the past couple years. These banks secure a funding premium in wholesale and deposit markets from the implicit state guarantee of obligations attaching to their too big to fail status. The subsidy distorts competition and risk taking, storing up even more future draws on beleaguered taxpayers. The second was a blogpost summarising recent comments of a Bank of England executive to the effect that all the cost savings generated by technology advances and automation in the banking sector had been paid away in increased bonuses and remuneration. IT efficiency gains fund bonus payments. The financial sector's appetite for technology investment is not driven by a desire to provide more efficient services, but to secure ever larger remuneration packages. In fact, rapid financial innovation and technology transformation has led to less efficient intermediation if evaluated on a cost basis.

Regulation has had a pernicious effect in driving technology and complexity. As Chris Skinner observes,

Put another way, in the first iteration of the Basel Accord there were seven risk metrics requiring seven calculations; by the time we get around to implementing Basel III, over 200,000 risk categories will require over 200 million calculations.

At some point policy makers will need to turn their efforts from reinforcing and bailing out the bankers who use any and every opportunity to take public support as private bonuses and instead evaluate much simpler, lower cost models of financial intermediation likely to yield domestic investment in domestic businesses and assets.

I can almost hear the shouts of "socialist" from the usual defenders of banks and markets. I am not advocating state nationalistion of banks, but state withdrawal of explicit and implicit bank subsidies.

It is a conservative principle that the state should intervene when markets fail. If the banking system has failed (and it has) and requires a taxpayer subsidy to continue to operate (which it does), then conservative principles dictate that the state must intervene to secure a resolution in the public interest. More of the same is not a conservative policy, but social welfare for bankers.

We currently have a system of excess regulatory complexity, hidden market distortions and public subsidies. Moving away from the status quo requires state action to identify and reduce subsidy through promotion of business models that are simpler, more transparent and more directly aimed at securing public benefit.

Concentration, Manipulation and Margin Calls

Over the past 25 years the financial markets of the world have become highly concentrated in the intermediation of a handful of firms, and regulation has been harmonised in the interests of these few firms. As Adam Smith - that great proponent of free markets - cogently observed:

“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”

Sadly, these few global firms have been for some time in "a conspiracy against the public", and have subverted the organs of public governance and the infrastructure of the financial markets to their purposes. Regulators and legislatures have done what they were asked to do in rubber stamping the policies that promoted further concentration, assured the whole time that it would result in "efficient markets", when the reality has been entirely otherwise. Exchanges were demutualised, and their new owners installed electronic trading systems to a common design, with provision for co-located HFT servers right next to the exchange's boxes to better front run their client orders. Clearinghouses were demutualised, and their new owners installed common margin algorithms and collateral rules that created a liquidity bias in their favour, reinforcing their control of global liquidity. Regulators liberalised over-the-counter markets, off-exchange trading and shadow banking so that the real trade flows that drive global markets occur well out of sight or supervision.

Four global banks are intermediaries in 85 percent of OTC derivatives transactions. The same banks dominate prime brokerage. The same banks own large equity interests in the now demutualised exchanges, clearinghouses and even warehouses of the global markets. Naturally, the same banks dominated underwriting of securitised assets. The implications have scarcely been grasped of what this portends in terms of the information asymmetries and the opportunity to manipulate markets without risk.

Each of these roles gives these few banks a view into the positions of market investors. They know who owns what, using what leverage, under what terms, and trading in which markets. Knowing that, the manipulation of prices to impoverish investors and enrich the ruling banks is child's play with a bit of ill-transparent HFT through proprietary dealing desks and connected hedge funds aligned with the firms.

These banks will protest that there are Chinese walls between their trading desks and the market infrastructure they own. The problem with Chinese walls is that they have chinks in them. (Apologies to PC crowd, but it is an old Wall Street joke I'm quoting.) We have seen from what is now reported about securitisations, that these banks structured products to trade against their clients, often colluding with hedge funds to share the profits. Is it likely that when they balance the public interest in market integrity against next year's bonus they become much more altruistic?

In October 2008 the global financial markets crashed. The story in the media is that it was a panic caused by the insolvency of Lehman Brothers. This is not the truth - or at least not all of it. The crash actually followed a $2 trillion margin call by these four global banks on their prime brokerage clients and OTC counterparties - effectively a 30 per cent increase in required margin. It was the margin call that forced liquidation of global portfolios of all asset classes - and particularly the high quality, most liquid asset classes.

Eligible margin is defined by bilateral agreement for both prime brokerage and OTC derivatives. According to the ISDA Margin Survey for 2009, the eligible collateral at the time of the crash was predominantly US dollar cash, euro cash and US Treasury securities.

Bilateral agreements are not made public, and neither are the margin calls. This is why the $2 trillion dollar margin call did not make the news. Each prime brokerge client and each OTC counterparty dealt with their margin call as a bilateral obligation, despite it being systemically the most important event in the history of financial markets.

As the markets crashed, the US Congress was threatened with chaos and martial law if it did not pass the Paulson Plan to grant $700 billion to Wall Street banks without any formal process or review. The Federal Reserve in parallel innovated a series of secret, extra-legal measures to give money to the same banks in exchange for assets which would never be disclosed, publicly valued or audited. The need to raise dollar liquidity globally to meet margin calls in US dollar led to the innovation of central bank dollar swaps - to preferred central banks only, of course.

After all the global liquidity had been sucked into the hands of these few global banks, and the dollar surged to strength along with US Treasuries, the game of increasing leverage started all over. The firms sitting on all the margin cash and global liquidity bought up all the quality assets lying about the crashed global markets at deep discount, then they started lending again. They have been reporting huge profits consistently ever since as their clients and counterparties take the assets and exposures in this "recovery" on terms very profitable to those running the markets and liqudity business.

And remember, these few firms see all your positions and know all your clearing balances better than you can. And they chair all the margin committees at all your clearinghouses and exchanges too. And they even own the warehouses where you believe your gold, silver and other hedges against financial chaos are supposed to be stored.

We are now nearing the same global levels of leverage as prevailed in summer 2008. The political situations in the US and in Europe are unstable, and China is slowing. There is money to be made in instability.

It isn't the leverage that causes a crisis, but the margin call.

In the past few months we have seen a pattern of increased margin calls in exchange traded derivatives. It makes me wonder what is happening unseen in the OTC markets. The dollar is strengthening from its lows, indicating flows back to US counterparties. Perhaps another round in the game of liquidity manipulation has begun.

Leaving that aside, how would Adam Smith recommend that we protect ourselves from the well-entrenched tyranny of a global elite of manipulators? The only resilient solution is local, transparent markets with disintermediation of the controlling banks. Eliminating the information asymetries which allow them to see everyone's positions, leverage and trading activity - and trade and ration liquidity accordingly - would go a long way to preventing further concentration.

How to do this? Would the co-opted regulators allow markets that disintermediated reliable paymasters? Those are the questions we will grapple with after the next crash I suppose.

UPDATE: A timely example of the public spirit of exchange executives:

SEC -- Antonia Chion, Associate Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, added, “Johnson brazenly stole nonpublic information from NASDAQ and its listed companies in breach of his duties of confidentiality to his employer and clients. Johnson assured at least one corporate official that she could share material nonpublic information with him because he was obligated as a NASDAQ employee to hold such information in confidence, and then he illegally traded on it.”

Health Reform In Massachusetts

From the New York Times:

Mitt Romney’s defense of the Massachusetts health care reforms was politically self-serving. It was also true.

Despite all of the bashing by conservative commentators and politicians -- and the predictions of doom for national health care reform -- the program he signed into law as governor has been a success. The real lesson from Massachusetts is that health care reform can work, and the national law should work as well or even better.

Read the complete editorial here.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that finding a primary care physician for the first time will take a while, at least until Massachusetts can absorb all of the newly insured people. Although a familiar complaint from the left about the Affordable Care Act is that complete implementation takes too long, adding 32,000,000 people to the American health care apparatus by 2014 is realistically a very ambitious undertaking.

The health care infrastructure has evolved ("designed" is too kind a word) to accommodate different levels of insurance, with the uninsured and underinsured consigned to emergency care. (Which may or may not amount to much: By law, ED's must screen and stabilize anyone reporting to an emergency room for treatment. They must treat only if the screening identifies an actual emergency condition.) Until the infrastructure can adjust and provide an adequate number of primary care physicians and facilities, it's likely that many of the newly insured will continue to seek care in ED's.

Critics will cite what is a period of adjustment as evidence of failure, but the Affordable Care Act is a massive undertaking. Rushes to judgment will make no more sense than declaring the winner of a baseball game based on the score in the first inning.

Reverse Deductible

A problematic byproduct of the American approach to health care has been the divorcing of a substantial number of patients from health care costs. Patients with low deductibles and extensive coverage have little incentive to moderate use of health care; many economists believe that this contributes to medical inflation. Policy analysts from across the political spectrum have recommended higher deductibles as a antidote.

Yesterday during a talk at the University of Washington, Kaiser Permanente CEO George Halvorson turned this argument on its head. Deductibles, he argued, should reflect the French approach and come only after payment had been exhausted. It works like this: Insurers cover a given procedure up to a standard amount. The patient pays anything in excess of that. Halvorson believes that this sets up a a situation in which doctors will compete to design procedures that charge the standard amount. Nothing prevents anyone from charging more for a blue-ribbon approach, but in that case the only people paying more would be those who chose to.

This one is new on me, and I don't know what the arguments against it would be. However, there are definite holes in the idea of charging higher deductibles. For one, companies that offer insurance with low deductibles and extensive coverage are unlikely to change this practice even though it would mean lower costs for them.

Businesses don't offer gold-plated benefits packages out of altruism: They offer such benefits because they are competing for employees. They're unlikely to adopt an approach that would put them at a competitive disadvantage; it would be penny-wise and pound-foolish for Google to lower benefits if that reduced their intellectual capital by putting them at a recruiting disadvantage with Microsoft. Thus, the very people who overuse the health care system would be unaffected by the high-deductible policy meant to curb their enthusiasm...

Halvorson, a Norwegian-American, favored the audience with a Norwegian joke: "Then there was the husband who loved his wife so much that he almost told her"...

The New York Times: The Ryan Plan for Medicaid

Whatever you call this, it's not reform and -- except to its victims -- it's not serious. It is a thinly disguised way for the federal government to wash its hands of the health care needs of 60 million Americans by driving them further into poverty.

The real problem with Medicaid is that it is being overwhelmed by an economy that generates poverty as rabbits generate more rabbits. Today, more than 60 million Americans receive Medicaid, and many economists and sociologists argue that the United States' antiquated definition of poverty keeps as many as 30-60 million more from Medicaid eligibility.

The GINI coefficient has measured income inequality since the 1920s. Without going into a lengthy statistical discourse, the closer a country's measurement to zero, the less its disparity in income.  Sweden has the lowest GINI coefficient (23); the US measure of 45.7 is markedly higher than any country in western Europe, higher than that of Jamaica, equal to Uganda's. Moreover, in the last fifteen years the European Union has declined slightly (from 31.2 to 30.4) while America's has grown from 40.8 to 45.7.

To truly reform Medicaid, the US must reduce the number of people who need it by implementing policies that build the middle class instead of eroding it.